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I. INTRODUCTION
Electronics systems design is increasingly uses Intellec-
tual Property (IP) cores. The means, however, that can render
the IP core unusable if it has been obtained illegally [1]
have not yet been identified. We describe lightweight locking
schemes lacking in the state of the art. In Section II we
identify common locking points on an IP, before describing
locking schemes in Section III. Section IV concludes.
II. LOCKING-BASED PROTECTION SCHEMES
Authentication and locking schemes can be combined to
fight counterfeiting and overbuilding [2], [3]. In case the
IP core was illegally obtained, a locking circuitry makes
it unusable. Common features can be turned into locking
schemes: the FSM [2] or the CPU, the I-O ports [4], the
clock manager or the address part of the memory bus.
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED LOCKING SCHEMES
Locking a finite state machine: The first way to achieve
functional locking is to add an extra FSM, the locking FSM,
before the start state of the original FSM [2]. This controls
access to the normal behaviour of the device.
Processor backup and restore: The processor used here
is the Plasma CPU [5]. By holding the current program
counter value, the processor stops fetching new instructions.
When the processor is locked, it executes NOP instructions
instead. The locking procedure cannot be initiated at any
time though. Indeed, long and branching instructions are
problematic and do not allow for a correct return to normal
operation. They can be detected using the CPU opcodes.
Locking is not time-critical. It can be postponed for several
clock cycles, to ensure a safe return to normal operation.
Locking inputs: An IP can be locked by preventing it
from receiving data, by acting on the clock-enable input of
the input flip-flops. By setting this input at low level, the flip
flop keeps its previous value, and the circuit will be locked.
Clock signal modifier: Acting on the clock-enable input
of a clock buffer modifies the clock signal. The aim here is
to place as few elements as possible on the clock signal path.
FPGAs from Altera and Xilinx have built-in clock buffers,
useful for clock-gating, or for high fan-out clocks. The clock-
enable input of the clock buffer is controlled by the output
of a three-to-one multiplexer. It selects one of the following
signals: a high logic level, for full-functionality mode, a low
logic level, for locked mode, and the output of a mod N
counter generating a pulse when its value is 1 for evaluation
mode, with lower frequency and thus lower performance.
Phase-locked loop (PLL) reconfiguration: Most mod-
ern FPGAs embed reconfigurable PLLs. The reconfiguration
procedure, however, is specific to each FPGA vendor, and
requires a proprietary module. The overhead is high, and can
not be significantly reduced without replacing this module.
Memory bus pseudo-random scrambling: To function-
ally lock the circuit, the address part of the memory bus
can be scrambled to make read data unreliable. An LFSR
is used as a pseudo-randomness source for scrambling. We
need to carefully chose the LFSR feedback polynomial for
a lightweight implantation, so that most of its coefficients
are 0s, since each coefficient equal to 1 requires a XOR
gate. The n bits of the LFSR are then XORed with the n-
bit address bus. Finally, a multiplexer selects the original
address bus or the scrambled one.
IV. CONCLUSION
We compared features of an IP that can be leveraged for
functional locking. Clock-based locking is a flexible, pow-
erful yet lightweight option. A balance between efficiency
and resources is the main point addressed by the designer.
Acknowledgement: The work presented in this paper was realized in
the frame of the SALWARE project number ANR-13-JS03-0003 supported
by the French ”Agence Nationale de la Recherche” and by the French
”Fondation de Recherche pour l’Ae´ronautique et l’Espace”, funding for
this project was also provided by a grant from ”La Re´gion Rhoˆne-Alpes”.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Gorman, “Counterfeit chips on the rise,” IEEE Spectrum,
vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 16–17, 2012.
[2] Y. Alkabani, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak, “Remote activa-
tion of ICs for piracy prevention and digital right management,”
in IEEE/ACM international conference on CAD, China, 2007,
pp. 674–677.
[3] L. Gaspar, V. Fischer, T. Guneysu, and Z. C. Jouini, “Two IP
protection schemes for multi-FPGA systems,” in International
Conference on Reconfigurable Computing and FPGAs, Mex-
ico, 2012, pp. 1–6.
[4] A. Basak, Y. Zheng, and S. Bhunia, “Active defense against
counterfeiting attacks through robust antifuse-based on-chip
locks,” in IEEE 32nd VLSI Test Symp., USA, 2014, pp. 1–6.
[5] Opencores website. [Online]. Available: opencores.org
